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Abstract
Extensive-form games constitute the standard representation scheme
for games with a temporal component. But do all extensive-form games
correspond to protocols that we can implement in the real world? We
often rule out games with imperfect recall, which prescribe that an agent
forget something that she knew before. In this paper, we show that even
some games with perfect recall can be problematic to implement. Specifi-
cally, we show that if the agents have a sense of time passing (say, access to
a clock), then some extensive-form games can no longer be implemented;
no matter how we attempt to time the game, some information will leak
to the agents that they are not supposed to have. We say such a game
is not exactly timeable. We provide easy-to-check necessary and sufficient
conditions for a game to be exactly timeable. Most of the technical depth
of the paper concerns how to approximately time games, which we show
can always be done, though it may require large amounts of time. Specif-
ically, we show that for some games the time required to approximately
implement the game grows as a power tower of height proportional to the
number of players and with a parameter that measures the precision of the
approximation at the top of the power tower. In practice, that makes the
games untimeable. Besides the conceptual contribution to game theory,
we believe our methodology can have applications to preventing informa-
tion leakage in security protocols.
1 Introduction
The extensive form is a very powerful representation scheme for games. It allows
one to naturally specify how the game unfolds over time, and what each player
knows at each point of action. This allows one to model, for example, card games
such as poker, but also real-world strategic situations with similar aspects.
Besides asking whether all strategic situations one might encounter in the
real world can be modelled as extensive-form games, one may also ask whether
all extensive-form games correspond to something one might encounter in the
real world. This question is important for several reasons. One is that if the
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answer is “no,” then there should be some well-motivated restricted subclasses
of extensive-form games that may be more tractable from the perspective of
algorithmic and other theoretical analysis. Another is that if we are interested
in designing a protocol, extensive-form games give us a natural language in
which to express the protocol—but this language may lead us astray if some of
its games are not actually implementable in the real world.
Games of imperfect recall, in which an agent sometimes forgets something
she knew before, constitute a natural example of games that may be difficult to
implement in the real world.1 Indeed, restricting attention to perfect recall is
often useful for algorithmic and other theoretical purposes. From a theoretical
perspective, perfect recall is required [9] for behavioral strategies to be as ex-
pressive as mixed strategies. Perfect recall also allows for the use of the sequence
form [14], which allows linear optimization techniques to be used for computing
equilibria of two-person extensive-form games [15]. The sequence form can also
be used to compute equilibrium refinements [11, 10], again requiring perfect
recall. Without perfect recall, otherwise simple single agent decision problems
become complicated [13, 1, 2], and even the existence of equilibria in behavior
strategies becomes NP-hard to decide [4]. Imperfect recall has proven useful
for computing approximate minimax strategies for poker [16], even though the
agent following the strategy does have perfect recall when playing the game.
We believe that many researchers are under the impression that, given any
finite extensive-form game of perfect recall, one could in principle have agents
play that game in the real world, with the actions of the game unfolding in
the order suggested by the extensive form. In this paper, we prove that this
is not so, at least if agents have a sense of time. If the players have a sense
of time, we show that some games cannot be implemented in actual time in a
way that respects the information sets of the extensive form. The games that
can be implemented in time are exactly those that have chronologically ordered
information sets, as defined in a set of lecture notes by [18, page 91]. Weibull
argues that games with this property constitute the natural domain of sequen-
tial equilibria [8]. The concept of sequential equilibrium is arguably the most
used equilibrium refinement for extensive-form games with imperfect informa-
tion. [7] provided an example where the unique sequential equilibrium requires
some level of cognitive dissonance from the players [17], forcing a player to
best-respond to strategies that are not consistent with her beliefs. However, ex-
amples of this type only work because they have no ordering of the information
sets, which is Weibull’s point in restricting attention to games with chronologi-
cally ordered information sets. In this paper, we argue something stronger: we
argue that extensive-form games without this property cannot model any real
world strategic situation, since the information structure of the model cannot
be enforced.
We emphasize that our paper is not intended as a criticism of extensive-
form games. Rather, the goal is to point out a natural restriction – timeability
1Computer poker provides some amusing anecdotes in this regard. When comparing two
poker-playing bots by letting them play a sequence of hands, one way to reduce the role of
luck and thereby improve statistical significance is to wipe clean the bots’ memory and let
them play the same sequence of hands again, but with the bots’ roles in the hands reversed.
This is not feasible for human players, of course. Because of this, events pitting computers
against humans have generally pitted a pair of players against one copy of the bot each, in
separate rooms. In this setup, each human-computer pair receives the same hands, though
the bot’s role in one room is the human’s role in the other.
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– that is needed to ensure that the game can be implemented as intended in
practice. Again, perfect recall is a restriction that is similar in nature. Restrict-
ing attention to those games that have perfect recall has been useful for many
purposes, and the notion has also been useful to understand why certain games
have odd features—namely, they have imperfect recall. We suspect the notion
of timeability can be used similarly, and encourage game theorists (algorithmic
or otherwise) to, in contexts where they consider the restriction of perfect recall,
consider that of timeability as well.
One place where the analogy between timeability and perfect recall perhaps
breaks down is that we have shown that games that are not exactly timeable
can nevertheless be approximately timed, in some cases even in a reasonable
amount of time. It is not clear whether an analogous notion of approximately
perfect recall could be given.
Most of our technical work concerns whether games that do not have an exact
timing can nevertheless be approximately timed, and if so, how much time is
required to do so. This latter contribution may have important ramifications
for the design of protocols that run a risk of leaking information to participants
based on the times at which they are requested to take action. While we show
that all games are at least approximately timeable, we also show that some
games require so much time that in practice they are untimeable.
1.1 Motivating example
Consider the following simple 2-player extensive-form game (Figure 1(a)). In it,
first a coin is tossed that determines which player goes first. Then, each player,
in turn, is asked to guess whether she has gone first. If the player is correct, she
is paid 1 (and otherwise 0). The information sets of the game suggest that a
player cannot at all distinguish the situation where she goes first from the one
where she goes second, and thus, she gets expected utility 1/2 no matter her
strategy.
However, now consider implementing this game in practice. Assume that
the game starts at time 0. Clearly, if we toss the coin at time 0, ask one player
to bet at time 1, and the other at time 2, a time-aware player will know exactly
whether she is being asked first or second (assuming the timing protocol is
common knowledge), and will act accordingly. This implementation blatantly
violates the intended information structure of the extensive-form representation
of the game; indeed, it results in an entirely different game (one that is much
more beneficial to the players!). We say that this protocol is not an exact timing
of the game in Figure 1(a).
Of course, the general protocol of taking one action per time unit is a per-
fectly fine timing of many games, including games where every action is public
(as in, say, Texas Hold’em poker). Also, there are games where taking one
action per time unit fails to exactly time the game, but nevertheless an exact
timing is available. For example, consider the modified game in Figure 1(b),
where player 1 only plays if the coin comes up Heads, and if so plays first. This
game can be timed by letting player 1 play at time 1 and player 2 at time 2,
even if player 1 does not go first.
But what about the game in Figure 1(a)? Can it not be timed at all? We will
pose the constraint that there must be at least one time unit between successive
actions in the extensive form. Without this constraint, we could take the normal
3
(0,1)(0,0)(1,1)(1,0) (1,0)(0,0)(1,1)(0,1)
(a)
(0,1)(0,0)(1,1)(1,0)
(0,0)(0,1)
(b)
(0,0)
(1,1)(1,0)
(0,0)
(1,1)(0,1)
(c)
Figure 1: Three examples. The roots are Chance nodes where Chance chooses
its move uniformly at random. Dashed information sets belong to player 1 and
dotted ones to player 2. The node in game (b) that forms its own information
set belongs to player 1.
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form of the game and let players play it by declaring their entire strategy at
once—but this scheme violates the natural interpretation of the extensive form,
and would allow us to play games of imperfect recall just as well. (One may argue
that we should just let the players play in parallel after the coin flip in the game
in Figure 1(a)—however, a simple modification of the game where the second
player is only offered a bet if the first player guessed correctly (Figure 1(c))
would disallow this move.) It is easy to see that no deterministic timing will
suffice. This is because every node within an information set would have to
have the same time associated with it; but then, the left-hand side of the tree
requires that player 1’s information set has a time strictly before that of player
2, but the right-hand side implies the opposite.
For games where deterministic timing cannot be done, one might turn to
randomized timing when trying to implement the game. However, if the time
at which a node is played is to reveal no information whatsoever about which
node in the information set has been reached, then the distribution over times
at which it is played must be identical for each node in the information set. But
this cannot be achieved in the game in Figure 1(a), because the left-hand side
of the tree ensures that the expectation of the time distribution for player 1’s
information set must be at least 1 lower than that for player 2’s information
set, but the right-hand side implies the opposite. Still, we may achieve some-
thing with randomization. For example, we may draw an integer i uniformly at
random from [N − 1] = {1, . . . , N − 1}, offer the first player a bet at time i and
the second player a bet at time i + 1. Then, if a player is offered a bet at time
1 or time N , the player will know exactly at which node in the extensive form
she is. On the other hand, if she is offered a bet at any time t ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1},
she obtains no additional information at all, because the conditional probability
of t being the selected time is the same whether she is the first or the second
player to move. Hence, as long as i ∈ {2, . . . , N − 2}, which happens with prob-
ability (N − 3)/(N − 1), neither player learns anything from the timing. We
say the game is approximately timeable: we can come arbitrarily close to timing
the game by increasing N , the number of time periods used. This immediately
raises the question of whether all games are approximately timeable, and if so
how large N needs to be for a particular approximation.
1.2 Our contribution
In the next section we define exactly timeable games, give a characterization of
these games, and show that there is a linear-time algorithm that decides whether
an extensive-form game is exactly timeable. In Section 3 we define ǫ-timeability
and argue that this is the correct definition. In Section 4 we show that all
extensive-form games are ǫ-timeable for any ǫ > 0, but in Section 5 we show
that these ǫ-timings can easily become too time-consuming for this universe:
for any number r, there exists a game Γr such that for sufficiently small ǫ,
any ǫ-timing of Γr will take time at least 2
2...2
1
ǫ
where the tower has height
r. In Section 6 we ask what happens if we have some control over the players’
perception of time. We assume that there exists a constant c such that any
player will always perceive a time interval of length t as having length between
t
c
and ct, and otherwise we have complete control over the players’ perception
of time. We show that even under these assumptions, the lower bound from
5
Section 5 still holds.
2 Exactly timeable games
Definition 1. For an extensive-form game2 Γ, a deterministic timing is a la-
belling of the nodes in Γ with non-negative real numbers such that the label
of any node is at least one higher than the label of its parent. A deterministic
timing is exact if any two nodes in the same information set have the same label.
An exact deterministic timing is the same as the time function in the defi-
nition of a chronological order by [18]. Since we will also be discussing games
that cannot be timed, we need this more general definition of timings that are
not exact.
This definition allows times to be nonnegative real numbers rather than
integers, which makes some of the proofs cleaner. However, given a deterministic
timing with real values, one can always turn it into a timing with integer values
by taking the floor function of each of the times.
The following theorem says that it is easy to check whether a game has an
exact deterministic timing, providing multiple equivalent criteria. Criterion 2
is presumably most useful for a human being looking at small extensive-form
games, while criterion 3 is easy for a computer to check.
Theorem 1. For an extensive-form game Γ, the following are equivalent:
1. Γ has an exact deterministic timing.
2. The game tree Γ can be drawn in such a way that a node always has a lower
y-coordinate than its parent, and two nodes belong to the same information
set if and only if they have the same y-coordinate.
3. Contracting each information set in the directed graph Γ to a single node
results in a graph without oriented cycles.
Proof. “1 ⇒ 2:” Given an exact deterministic timing (WLOG, with integer-
valued times), we draw Γ such that each node has y-coordinate equal to the
negative of its time. As the timing is exact, nodes in the same information
set have the same y-coordinate. To ensure that any two nodes with the same
y-coordinate are in the same information set, we perturb each node based on its
information set. This can be done deterministically: for example, if there are q
information sets in the game, then subtract i/q from the time of each node in
the ith information set.
“2⇒ 3:” Given such a drawing, contracting each information set results in
all edges going downwards, so the resulting graph cannot have directed cycles.
“3⇒ 1:” The nodes of a directed acyclic graph can be numbered such that
each edge goes from a smaller to a larger number. This numbering can be used
as a deterministic timing.
We can use criterion 3 of Theorem 1 to test whether the games in Figure
1(a) and 1(b) are timeable. First we draw a node for each information set: One
2For an introduction to the game-theoretical concepts used in this paper, see, for exam-
ple, [12]
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: Example of how to use Theorem 1. The top node is the Chance
node, the left node corresponds to player 1’s information set, and the right
node corresponds to player 2’s information set.
for the root, one for player 1’s information set and one for player 2’s information
set. (If one of the players had more than one information set, that player would
have had more than one node in the contracted graph.) We ignore the leaves,
as they can never form cycles. In the games in Figure 1(a) and 1(b), we can get
from the root to each of the two players’ information sets, so we draw a directed
edge from the root to each of the two other nodes. We can also get from player
1’s information set to player 2’s, and in the game in Figure 1(a) we can go from
player 2’s information set to player 1’s. When we draw these directed edges
(without multiplicity) we get Figure 2(a) and Figure 2(b), respectively. We see
that the graph in Figure 2(a) has a cycle, so the game in Figure 1(a) is not
exactly timeable, while graph in Figure 2(b) does not have a cycle, so the game
in Figure 1(b) is exactly timeable. The contracted graph can be constructed
in linear time, and given this directed graph, we can in linear time test for
cycles [3]. Thus, we can test in linear time whether a game is exactly timeable.
3 ǫ-timeability
We now move on to approximate timeability.
Definition 2. The total variation distance (also called statistical distance) be-
tween two discrete random variables X1 and X2 is given by
δ(X1, X2) =
∑
x
max(Pr(X1 = x)− Pr(X2 = x), 0)
where the sum is over all possible values of X1 and X2. This measure is symmet-
ric inX1 andX2. If δ(X1, X2) ≤ ǫ we say thatX1 andX2 are ǫ-indistinguishable.
A (randomized) timing is a discrete distribution over deterministic timings.
For a game, a timing of the game, a player and a node v belonging to that player,
the player’s timing information is the sequence of times for nodes belonging to
that player on the path from the root to v (including v itself). Thus, for a fixed
game, timing, player, and node, the timing information is a random variable.
The timing is an ǫ-timing if for any two nodes in the same information set,
the total variation distance between the timing information at the two nodes is
less than ǫ. A 0-timing is also called an exact timing.
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A game is exactly timeable if it has an exact timing, ǫ-timeable if it has an
ǫ-timing, and approximately timeable if it is ǫ-timeable for all ǫ > 0.
The following proposition implies that Γ being exactly timeable is equivalent
to each of the three criteria in Theorem 1.
Proposition 2. A game is exactly timeable if and only if it has an exact de-
terministic timing.
Proof. An exact deterministic timing is a special case of an exact randomized
timing. Conversely, given an exact randomized timing of a game, we can label
each node with its expected time to obtain an exact deterministic timing.
We will show that in fact all games are approximately timeable. We will
need the following properties of total variation distance. For proofs, see [6].
Proposition 3 (Data Processing Inequality for Total Variation Distance). Sup-
pose X1 and X2 have total variation distance ǫ, Y is a random variable inde-
pendent from X1 and X2, and f is a function. Then the total variation distance
between f(X1, Y ) and f(X2, Y ) is at most ǫ.
Proposition 4. Let X1, . . . , Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn, I be independent random variables
with Xi and Yi distributed on Xi, and I distributed on [n]. Let X = XI and
Y = YI . We have δ(X,Y ) ≤
∑n
i=1 Pr(I = i)δ(Xi, Yi), with equality if all the
Xi’s are pairwise disjoint.
Proposition 5. If X1 and X2 are discrete random variables taking real values
in an interval [a, b] and EX2 ≥ EX1 + 1 then δ(X1, X2) ≥
1
b−a .
Proposition 6. Let (X1, X2, T ) be random variables with some joint distribu-
tion, where T only takes values 0 and 1, Pr(T = 0) = ǫ < 1, and δ(X1, X2) = δ.
For i ∈ {1, 2} define X ′i = Xi|T=1. Then δ(X
′
1, X
′
2) ≤
δ+ǫ
1−ǫ .
3.1 ǫ-timeability and ǫ-approximate Nash equilibria
In this section we will argue that our definition of ǫ-timeability is the correct
one, because it gives a bound on how much the players can gain in expectation
per choice from having the timing information. If one is playing a game Γ with
timing X , one can think of this as really playing a different game Γ′ whose first
node is a Chance node that chooses from among all the possible timings, with a
distribution given by X . Then, each possible choice by Chance leads to a copy
of Γ, and two nodes in Γ′ are in the same information set if and only if they
correspond to nodes in Γ in the same information set and have the same timing
information.
We want to show that if Γ has utilities in [0, 1], X is an ǫ-timing, and a player
has at most m nodes in any history, then that player can gain at most mǫ in
expectation from using the timing information.3 First, we show that there are
games where the gain can get arbitrarily close to mǫ.
3We do not rely on anything specific to timing here: the theorems and examples in this
section hold for any side information such that the total variation distance between the side
information for any two nodes in the same information set is at most ǫ.
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Example 1. Consider a game with m rounds and only one player. In each round,
Chance chooses a number uniformly at random from [k] and then the player can
either try to guess the number or pass. If she guesses, the game ends in that
round and she gets utility 1 if she was correct and 0 otherwise. If she passes,
the player learns the value that Chance chose, and they play another round. In
the last round, she is not allowed to pass.
It is clear that without any further information the player will get utility
exactly 1
k
no matter what strategy she uses. Now consider the following timing:
each node usually happens 1 later than the previous one. The only exceptions
are the nodes belonging to the player. At each of these nodes there is probability
ǫ that it is delayed (chosen independently for each node), and if it is delayed, it
will be delayed with i time units, where i is the number chosen by Chance.
First, we check that this is an ǫ-timing. We choose two nodes v and w in
the same information set. As they are in the same information set, they would
have to be in the same round j. Let Xv = (Xv,1, . . . , Xv,j) denote the timing
information at v and similar for w. Because the player learns Chance’s choice
after she passes, two nodes only belong to the same information set if Chance
made the same choices in all previous rounds. Thus, Xv,i = Xw,i for all i < j,
and the only difference between Xv and Xw comes from the difference between
Xv,j and Xw,j. Then, for fixed (x1, . . . , xj−1) there is a t such that Pr(Xv,j =
t|(Xv,1 . . . Xv,j−1) = (x1, . . . xj−1)) = 1 − ǫ = Pr(Xw,j = t|(Xv,1 . . .Xv,j−1) =
(x1, . . . , xj−1)). Thus, δ(Xv|(Xv,1,...,Xv,j−1=(x1,...,xj−1), Xw|(Xv,1,...,Xv,j−1)=(x1,...xj−1)) ≤
ǫ. By averaging over possible values of (x1, . . . , xj−1) we get δ(Xv, Xw) ≤ ǫ, so
the timing we have defined is an ǫ-timing.
We can now define a strategy for the player: if she sees a delay of time i she
will guess that Chance chose i. If she does not see a delay she will pass except
in the last round where she will guess randomly. The probability that she does
not see a delay is (1 − ǫ)m. Given that she does see a delay she is correct with
probability 1 and otherwise with probability 1
k
. As (1− ǫ)m ≈ 1−mǫ for small
ǫ, her expected utility is
(1− (1− ǫ)m) +
(1− ǫ)m
k
≈ mǫ
1−mǫ
k
=
1 + (k − 1)mǫ
k
.
Thus, for small ǫ, her advantage is close to k−1
k
mǫ, and for large k this is close
to mǫ.
Next we will see that one cannot gain more than mǫ by using the timing
information. First we show it for a one-player game with only one information
set.
Lemma 7. Let Γ be a one-player game where each history only contains two
moves. First, Chance makes a move, and then the player. All the player’s nodes
belong to the same information set. All utilities are in [0, 1]. Let Γ′ be the game
Γ with an ǫ-timing X. For any strategy σ′ for Γ′ achieving expected utility u
we can construct a strategy σ for Γ achieving utility at least u− ǫ. This σ only
depends on σ′ and the timing, not on Chance’s probabilities, the utilities at each
node, or u.
Proof. Let {1, . . . , k} denote the nodes belonging to the player, and letXi denote
the timing information available in Γ′ at node i. The strategy σ′ can be given
as a function that, given timing information x and some randomness Y ′, gives
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an action σ′(x, y′); then, σ should be a function that only takes randomness Y
and still outputs an action. We can decide the distribution of the randomness,
so we take Y = (X1, Y
′) where X1 and Y
′ are independent. That is, the player
generates her own timing information as if she were in node 1.
As Γ′ is ǫ-timed we have δ(X1, Xi) ≤ ǫ. By Proposition 3 this implies
δ(u(σ(Y )), u(σ′(Xi, Y
′))) = δ(u(σ′(X1, Y
′)), u(σ′(Xi, Y ))) ≤ ǫ,
and as u only takes values in [0, 1], Proposition 5 implies that Eu(σ′(Xi, Y
′))−
Eu(σ(Y )) ≤ ǫ. Thus, for each possible choice by Chance, the player loses at
most ǫ in expected utility given that choice.
We can now extend to general extensive-form games.
Theorem 8. Let Γ be an extensive form game of perfect recall game with util-
ities in [0, 1] where player i has at most m nodes in any history, and let Γ′ be
an ǫ-timed version of Γ. If σ′i is a player i strategy for Γ
′ there is a strategy σi
that does not use timing information, such that for any strategy profile (σ′i, σ
′
−i)
for Γ′ we have ui(σ
′
i, σ
′
−i)− ui(σi, σ
′
−i) ≤ mǫ.
Proof. Fix Γ and Γ′ and strategy profile (σ′i, σ
′
−i). For each information set in
Γ we modify player i’s strategy as in Lemma 7. Notice that we do not need
to know the other players’ strategies to do this. For each information set, she
generates new timing information even for the previous nodes for which she has
already generated timing information before.
For each node v we now compute player i’s expected utility given that she
is at that node. We know from Lemma 7 that when we change the strategy at
one node, the expected utility given that we reach that node goes down with
at most ǫ. We order the nodes belonging to player i in layers: If there are j
nodes belonging to player i on the path from the root to node v, we put node
v in the j’th layer. As we have perfect recall, each information set is contained
in one layer, and we have at most m layers. If we modify the strategy for all
the information set in one layer at a time, the total excepted utility goes down
with at most ǫ per layer, so if we modify the strategy for all layers, it goes down
with at most mǫ.
We then obtain the following corollary which justifies our definition of ǫ-
timeability.
Corollary 9. Let Γ be a perfect recall game with utilities in [0, 1] where each
player has at most m nodes in any history. If Γ′ is an ǫ-timing of Γ then any
Nash-equilibrium σ of Γ is an mǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium of Γ′.
4 Upper bound
From [6] we have the following definition and theorem.
Definition 3. Let X1, . . . , Xn be random variables over N with some joint
distribution such that we always have X1 < X2 < · · · < Xn. We say that
(X1, . . . , Xn) has ǫ-indistinguishablem-subsets if for any two subsets {i1, . . . , im}, {j1, . . . jm} ⊂
[n] of size m, the two random sets {Xi1 , . . . , Xin} and {Xj1 , . . . , Xjn} are ǫ-
indistinguishable. We slightly abuse notation and say that (X1, . . . , Xn) has
ǫ-indistinguishable subsets if for all m < n it has ǫ-indistinguishable m-subsets.
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In the following exp2 denotes the function given by exp2(x) = 2
x, and
expn2 (x) denotes iteration of exp2, so exp
n
2 (x) = 2
2...
2x
where the tower con-
tains n 2’s.
Theorem 10. For fixed n there exists a function N : (0, 1] → N such that for
all ǫ > 0 there exists a distribution of (X1, . . . , Xn) such that 1 ≤ X1 < X2 <
· · · < Xn ≤ N(ǫ) are all integers and X has ǫ-indistinguishable subsets. We can
choose N such that N(ǫ) = expn−22
(
O
(
1
ǫ
))
. Conversely, for such a distribution
to exist, we must have N(ǫ) = expn−22
(
Ω
(
1
ǫ
))
for sufficiently small ǫ.
The following gives intuition for the upper bound on N . For n = 2 it is
easy to construct (X1, X2) that has ǫ-indistinguishable subsets. For example,
we can take X1 to be uniformly distributed on [N − k] for some constants
N and k and set X2 = X1 + k. We can then use a recursive construction
for higher n. If (X1, . . . , Xn) has ǫ-indistinguishable subsets and consecutive
Xi’s are usually not too close to each other, we can construct (Y1, Y2 . . . , Yn+1)
that has ǫ′-indistinguishable subsets for some ǫ′. To do this, we choose Y1
uniformly between 1 and a sufficiently large number, and choose each gap Yi+1−
Yi uniformly and independently from
[
2Xi
]
. For a proof that this works, see [6].
The intuition about the lower bound on N is that for n = 2 an n− 1-subset
contains 1 number, and the size of this number gives away some information
about whether it is the higher or lowest. For n = 3 an n−1 subset contains two
numbers and their distance gives away some information about whether it is the
middle number or another number that is missing from the set. For n = 4 an
n− 1 subset contains 3 numbers, and now the ratios between the two distances
gives away information about which number is missing, and so on.
We can use the construction to approximately time any game.
Theorem 11. All games with at most m nodes in each history can be ǫ-timed
in time expm−3
(
O
(
1
ǫ
))
. In particular, all games are approximately timeable.
Proof. Take any game and ǫ > 0. We want to show that the game is ǫ-timeable.
First we find some distribution of (X1, . . . , Xm−1) that has ǫ-indistinguishable
subsets. Now we let the time of the root be 0 and the time of a node at depth
d be given by Xd. As the Xd take values in N and are increasing this gives a
timing of the game. If two nodes v and w belong to the same information set,
the player i who owns these nodes will have the same number j − 1 of previous
nodes at v and at w. As (X1, . . . , Xm−1) has ǫ-indistinguishable subsets, it has
ǫ-indistinguishable j-subsets, so if the root does not belong to player i there is
total variation distance less at most ǫ between the two nodes’ timing information.
Similarly, (X1, . . . , Xm−1) has ǫ-indistinguishable j − 1-subsets, so if the root
belongs to player i the total variation distance between the two nodes’ timing
information is also at most ǫ.
5 Lower bound for timing of games
The downside of the positive result in Theorem 11 is that the amount of time
needed is astronomical. We next show that this is to some extent inevitable.
Our goal is to show that for any r there exist games that cannot be ǫ-timed
in time expr2
(
O
(
1
ǫ
))
. As we only aim to show the existence of such games, we
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do not have to think about all possible games, but can rather concentrate on
games that are easy to analyze. In the following we will only look at choiceless
games. These are extensive-form games that begin with a move by Chance and
in which all the following nodes only have one child. The players do not learn
Chance’s move, so two nodes are in the same information set if they belong to
the same player and have the same number of previous nodes belonging to that
player. In these games the players never have a choice, so from the standard
game theory point of view, the fact that nodes in this game belong to players is
pointless. However, when we require the game to be timed, the nodes play an
important role: a player learns the time of all her nodes in the history that is
played, and this might reveal some information about which branch of the tree
the players are in. (Note also that any choiceless game that takes a long time to
ǫ-time can be turned into a game with choice that takes as long time to ǫ-time,
simply letting each player make a move at each node that does not affect future
actions or information in the game.)
We will restrict our attention even further, to a class of games we will call
symmetric choiceless games. These games are given by the number of players
n and a finite sequence over [n]. In the first move Chance chooses uniformly at
random between all the n! numberings of the n players. After this move, the
players have nodes in the order given by the sequence. For example, if n = 3
and the sequence is 233112 then the first node will belong to the player to whom
Chance assigned the number 2, the next node will belong to the player to whom
Chance assigned the number 3, and so on.
An instance of a timing of the 233112 game would give a time to each of the 6
nodes for each of the 6 histories (that is, for each possible assignment of numbers
1, 2, 3 to the three players). Thus, a deterministic timing contains 36 times, and
a timing is then a random tuple of 36 times. The timing is an ǫ-timing if for
any player and any two histories, the timing information for the two histories
have statistical distance at most ǫ. This implies that one player, Alice, cannot,
at any point in the game, tell (to a significant extent) the difference between
when she got assigned the number 1 and when she got assigned the number 2.
However, for the history where Alice is 1 and Bob is 2, the difference between
Alice’s timing information and Bob’s timing information is allowed to be large
because they are different players.
We say a timing of a symmetric choiceless game is symmetric if the time of
the ith node in a history only depends on i, not on the history. In the example
above, a symmetric timing would only consist of 6 times, one for each depth of
the tree.
Proposition 12. If a symmetric choiceless game has an ǫ-timing using time at
most N , then it has a symmetric ǫ-timing using time at most N .
In order to prove the proposition we need to define a notation for timings
of symmetric choiceless games. The point of the proposition is to show the we
do not need to consider general timings of symmetric choiceless games, so the
definition of timings will only be used for this one proof. Only the definition of
symmetric choiceless games will be used later.
Definition 4. A symmetric choiceless game is given by a number n and a finite
sequence Γ of length |Γ| over the set of players, {1, . . . , n}. Let Γi denote the
element in the i’th position in the sequence Γ.
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A timing of a symmetric choiceless game is a random tupleX = (Xσ,i)σ∈Sn,i∈[|Γ|]
of non-negative reals. For each σ and i we require that Xσ,i + 1 ≤ Xσ,i+1. A
symmetric timing is a timing where Xσ,i never depends on σ.
When using set notation we write a subscript j after the set to mean the
j’th smallest elements of the set. An ǫ-timing of Γ is a timing such that for any
player, p, and any two assignment of numbers to the players, σ, σ′ ∈ Sn and
any j ≤ |{Xσ,i|Γi = σ(p)}|, |{Xσ′,i|Γi = σ
′(p)}| we have {Xσ,i|Γi = σ(p)}j
ǫ
∼
{Xσ′,i|Γi = σ
′(p)}j .
Proof. Fix a symmetric choiceless game Γ on n players. Given an ǫ-timing X
we construct a symmetric ǫ-timing X ′ of the game: Let Π be a random variable
that is uniformly distributed on Sn independently from X . Now define x
′(x, π)
by x′(x, π)σ,i = xπ,i and let X
′ = x′(X,Π). This is clearly a symmetric timing.
We want to show that it is an ǫ-timing. To do this, fix a player, p, and
two histories. A history is given by the assignment of numbers to players, so
let σ and σ′ be the assignments that results in those two histories. We also
fix two number j which indicate how far we go in the history. We assume
j ≤ |{i|Γi = σ(p)}|, |{i|Γi = σ
′(p)}| As Π is uniformly distributed we have
{XΠ,i|Γi = σ(p)}j ∼ {Xσ◦Π,i|Γi = σ(Π(Π
−1(p)))}j
and similar for σ′. As X is an ǫ-timing we know that
{Xσ,i|Γi = σ(p
′)}j
ǫ
∼ {Xσ′,i|Γi = σ
′(p′)}j
for all p′, σ and σ′ where these sets contain at least j elements. By substituting
σ ◦ π for σ, σ′ ◦ π for σ′ and π−1(p) for p, where π ∈ Sn, we get
{Xσ◦π,i|Γi = σ(π(π
−1(p)))}j
ǫ
∼ {Xσ′◦π,i|Γi = σ
′(π(π−1(p)))}j .
By Proposition 4 this implies
{Xσ◦Π,i|Γi = σ(Π(Π
−1(p)))}j
ǫ
∼ {Xσ′◦Π,i|Γi = σ
′(Π(Π−1(p)))}j .
Putting it all together gives
{X ′σ,i|Γi = σ(p)}j ={XΠ,i|Γi = σ(p)}j
∼{Xσ◦Π,i|Γi = σ(Π(Π
−1(p)))}j
ǫ
∼{Xσ′◦Π,i|Γi = σ
′(Π(Π−1(p)))}j
∼{XΠ,i|Γi = σ
′(p)}j
={X ′σ′,i|Γi = σ
′(p)}j .
Hence, to show the lower bound, we only need to show that for any r there
exists a symmetric choiceless game that does not have a symmetric ǫ-timing
using time expr2
(
O
(
1
ǫ
))
. We will use induction, but in order to make the in-
duction hypothesis stronger, we will show something stronger: even if we allow
some freedom in which order we schedule the nodes, we cannot find a good
timing. To formalize this, we use something we call agendas. An example of
an agenda is 2|33|11|2, where the “|” are called separators. A timing of this
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agenda would give a time to each number and each separator. The times of e.g.
the 3’s do not have to be between those of the first and second separator, but
they cannot be assigned times that are “too much” on the wrong side of the
separators. Furthermore, two separators will always have times that are at least
one apart.
Definition 5. For players {1, . . . , n}, an agenda A is a finite sequence over
{|, 1, . . . , n}. Let ki be the number of times i occurs in the list, and k| the number
of times | occurs in the list. An (ǫ, λ)-timing of A is a random variable X =
(X|,1, . . . , X|,k| , X1,1, . . . , X1,k1 , X2,1, . . . , X2,k2 , . . . , Xn,1, . . . , Xn,kn) which is a
tuple of the same length as A, satisfying the following requirements.
1. Each Xi,j takes real numbers and each X|,j takes non-negative values.
2. For all j ∈ {1, . . . , k| − 1} we have X|,j + 1 ≤ X|,j+1.
3. For all i and j ∈ {1, . . . , ki − 1} we have Xi,j < Xi,j+1.
4. If the j1th occurrence of i in A is before the j2th occurrence of | then
Xi,j1 ≤ X|,j2 + λ.
5. If the j1th occurrence of i in A is after the j2th occurrence of | then
Xi,j1 ≥ X|,j2 − λ.
6. If ki = kj then δ(Xi, Xj) ≤ ǫ.
Notice that the only requirement that compares Xi,js is requirement 3, and
it simply says that for fixed i the Xi,js should be ordered. Otherwise, the Xi,js
are only “kept in place” by the X|,js. Also note that requirement 6 implies that
δ((Xi,1, . . . , Xi,k), (Xj,1, . . . , Xj,k)) ≤ ǫ whenever k ≤ ki = kj , but unlike for
games we have no such assumption when ki 6= kj . For an agenda A, we can
create a game ΓA by removing the separators. Then a symmetric ǫ-timing of ΓA
will give an (ǫ, λ)-timing of A for any λ ≥ 0. Hence, lower bounds on the time
needed to time agendas gives lower bounds on the time needed to time games.
The following proposition says that we can assume that all times Xi,j are
non-negative. However, when using the induction hypotheses, it will be useful
that we allow Xi,j to be negative.
Proposition 13. Let N, ǫ and λ < N be three numbers. If the agenda A has
an (ǫ, λ)-timing with Xi,j , X|,j ≤ N for all i and j, then A has an (ǫ, λ)-timing
where 0 ≤ Xi,j , X|,j ≤ N for all i and j.
Proof. Given a timing X of A we want to construct a timing X ′ of A that
only contains non-negative times. Let f : (−∞, λ] → (0, λ] be some increasing
bijection with f(x) ≥ x and define X ′|,j = X|,j and X
′
i,j = f(Xi,j) if Xi,j ≤ λ
and X ′i,j = Xi,j otherwise. As X is a timing of A we know that X
′
|,j = X|,j ≥ 0
for all j, so X ′ satisfies requirement 4 from the definition of (ǫ, λ)-timing. As
each X ′i can be obtained as a function of Xi requirement 6 is satisfied. It is easy
to see that X ′ satisfies the last 4 requirements.
The following lemma will be the base case of the induction proof. Here and
what follows, log denotes the base 2 logarithm.
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Lemma 14. For any
(
ǫ, 110
)
-timing of the agenda 2|33|11|2 we have Pr
(
X2,2 ≥ exp2
(
(2ǫ)−1
))
>
0.
Proof. Let λ = 110 . By Proposition 13 we can assume that Xi,j ≥ 0 for all i, j.
From X3,1 ≥ X|,1 − λ and X3,2 ≤ X|,2 + λ and X|,1 + 1 ≤ X|,2 we get
log(X3,2 −X3,1) ≤ log(X|,2 + λ− (X|,1 − λ))
= log(X|,2 −X|,1) + log
(
X|,2 −X|,1 + 2λ
X|,2 −X|,1
)
= log(X|,2 −X|,1) + log
(
1 +
2λ
X|,2 −X|,1
)
≤ log(X|,2 −X|,1) + log (1 + 2λ)
≤ log(X|,2 −X|,1) + 0.3.
Similarly, log(X1,2 −X1,1) ≤ log(X|,3 −X|,2) + 0.3 and
log(X2,2 −X2,1) ≥ log(X|,3 − λ− (X|,1 + λ))
= log(X|,3 −X|,1) + log
(
X|,3 −X|,1 − 2λ
X|,3 −X|,1
)
= log(X|,3 −X|,1) + log
(
1−
2λ
X|,3 −X|,1
)
≥ log(X|,3 −X|,1) + log (1− λ)
≥ log(X|,3 −X|,1)− 0.2.
We have X|,3−X|,1 = (X|,3−X|,2) + (X|,2−X|,1) so by Jensen’s inequality we
get
log(X|,3 −X|,1)− 1 = log
(
X|,3 −X|,1
2
)
≥
log(X|,3 −X|,2) + log(X|,2 −X|,1)
2
.
Thus,
E 2 log(X2,2 −X2,1) ≥E 2 log(X|,3 −X|,1)− 0.4
≥E log(X|,3 −X|,2) + log(X|,2 −X|,1) + 1.6
≥E log(X1,2 −X1,1) + log(X3,2 −X3,1) + 1.
So we must have at least one of E log(X2,2−X2,1) ≥ E log(X1,2−X1,1)+0.5 and
E log(X2,2−X2,1) ≥ E log(X3,2−X3,1)+0.5. Assume without loss of generality
that the former is the case. AsX is an ǫ-timing we have δ((X2,1, X2,2), (X1,1, X1,2)) ≤
ǫ so by Proposition 3 and 5 the logs must take values in an interval of length
at least 12ǫ . As the Xi,js always differ by at least one, the logs only take non-
negative values. Hence, log(X2,2 − X2,1) ≥
1
2ǫ with positive probability, so
X2,2 ≥ X2,2 −X2,1 ≥ 2
1
2ǫ with positive probability.
Lemma 15. Let ǫ, λ > 0 and c > 2 be given. If X is an (ǫ, λ)-timing of the
agenda 24|33|1441|22|13, there is probability at least 1− (8c+ 3
1− 2
c
)(2λ+ ǫ) that
either
1. X|,3 <
(c−1)X|,1+X|,4
c
and X|,2 <
(c−1)X|,1+X|,3
c
, or
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2. X|,2 >
X|,1+(c−1)X|,4
c
and X|,3 >
X|,2+(c−1)X|,4
c
.
Proof. Define f(x, y, z) = y−x
z−x . Let X|,−i denote the tuple X| with X|,i re-
moved. Then possibility 1 from the statement of the lemma is equivalent to
f(X|,−2), f(X|,−4) <
1
c
and possibility 2 is equivalent to f(X|,−3), f(X|,−1) >
1− 1
c
. We have
f(X|,−4)f(X|,−2) =
X|,2 −X|,1
X|,3 −X|,1
X|,3 −X|,1
X|,4 −X|,1
=
X|,2 −X|,1
X|,4 −X|,1
= f(X|,−3).
We see that for x < y < z the function f is increasing in y and decreasing in x
and z and it gives values in (0, 1). Furthermore, f(x+a, y+a, z+a) = f(x, y, z).
We now have
f(X|,−4) =f(X|,1 + λ,X|,2 + λ,X|,3 + λ)
=f(X|,1 + λ,X|,2 − λ,X|,3 + λ) +
2λ
X|,3 −X|,1
≤f(X4,1, X4,2, X4,3) + λ
=f(X4) + λ.
Here the inequality follows from the inequalities between the X|,is and the X4,is,
and fromX|,3−X|,1 ≥ 2. Similarly, we get f(X|,−2) ≤ f(X2)+λ and f(X|,−3) ≥
f(X3)− λ.
AsX is an (ǫ, λ)-timing and f takes values in [0, 1], we get E (f(X4)− f(X3)) ≤
ǫ. So
E
(
f(X|,−4)− f(X|,−3)
)
=E
(
f(X|,−4)− f(X4) + f(X4)− f(X3) + f(X3)− f(X|,−3)
)
≤λ+ ǫ+ λ
=2λ+ ǫ,
and similarly E
(
f(X|,−2)− f(X|,−3)
)
≤ 2λ + ǫ. In the other direction, the
monotonicity of f implies that f(X|,−4) > f(X|,−3) and f(X|,−2) > f(X|,−3).
Using f(X|,−4)f(X|,−2) = f(X|,−3) we get
E
(
f(X|,−4)(1− f(X|,−2)) + f(X|,−2)(1− f(X|,−4))
)
= E
(
f(X|,−4) + f(X|,−2)− 2f(X|,−2)f(X|,−4)
)
= E
(
f(X|,−4)− f(X|,−3) + f(X|,−2)− f(X|,−3)
)
≤ 4λ+ 2ǫ.
If f(x|,−4) ∈
[
1
c
, 1− 1
c
]
we see that
f(x|,−4)(1−f(x|,−2))+f(x|,−2)(1−f(x|,−4)) ≥
1
c
(1−f(x|,−2))+f(x|,−2)
1
c
=
1
c
.
By Markov’s inequality Pr(f(X|,−4) ∈
[
1
c
, 1− 1
c
]
) ≤ (4λ + 2ǫ)c. Similarly for
X|,−2.
The agenda 24|33|1441|22|13 has a symmetry: if we swap 1 and 4 and swap
2 and 3 we reverse the order of the numbers (ignoring the order of numbers
between two separators). Hence, we can go through the above proof with 1 −
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f(X|,−1) instead of f(X|,−4), and 1 − f(X|,−2) instead of f(X|,−3) and so on.
This would give us Pr(f(X|,−1) ∈
[
1
c
, 1− 1
c
]
) ≤ (4λ + 2ǫ)c and Pr(f(X|,−3) ∈[
1
c
, 1− 1
c
]
) ≤ (4λ+ 2ǫ)c.
We know that f(X|,−4) > f(X|,−3) and E
(
f(X|,−4)− f(X|,−3)
)
≤ 2λ + ǫ,
so by Markov’s inequality, the probability that f(X|,−4) and f(X|,−3) are both
in [0, 1
c
) ∪ (1 − 1
c
, 1] but in two different parts of it is at most 2λ+ǫ
1− 2
c
. Similarly
for the pair f(X|,−3) and f(X|,−2) and for the pair f(X|,−2) and f(X|,−1). Let
T be the random variable that is 1 if for all i ∈ [4] we have f(X|,−i) ∈
[
0, 1
c
)
, or
if for all i ∈ [4] we have f(X|,−i) ∈
(
1− 1
c
, 1
]
. Otherwise T = 0. By the union
bound, Pr(T = 0) ≤ 4(4λ + 2ǫ)c + 3 2λ+ǫ
1− 2
c
= (8c + 3
1− 2
c
)(2λ + ǫ). When T = 1
we either have f(X|,−i) for all i, and the first case of the conclusion holds, or
f(X|,−i) > 1−
1
c
, and the second case of the conclusion holds.
Proposition 16. Let c > 2 and x1 < · · · < xn be a sequence such that for all
i ∈ [n− 3] we have either
1. xi+2 <
(c−1)xi+xi+3
c
and xi+1 <
(c−1)xi+xi+2
c
, or
2. xi+1 >
xi+(c−1)xi+3
c
and xi+2 >
xi+1+(c−1)xi+3
c
.
Then it must be the same of the two conditions that holds for every i. If it is
the first then xi+1 − xi ≥
(
c− 1
c
− 1
)
(xi − x1) for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}. If it is
the second then xi − xi−1 ≥
(
c− 1
c
− 1
)
(xn − xi) for all i ∈ {2, . . . n− 1}.
Proof. If the first equality holds for some i we have xi+2 <
(c−1)xi+xi+3
c
<
(c−1)xi+1+xi+3
c
< xi+1+xi+32 and xi+1 ≤
(c−1)xi+xi+2
c
< xi+xi+22 . This implies
xi+1−xi < xi+2−xi+1 < xi+3−xi+2. Similarly, if the second set of inequalities
holds for some i, the gaps get smaller. Hence, if xi+1−xi < xi+2−xi+1 we know
that for both i−1 and i we must be in the first case and if xi+1−xi > xi+2−xi+1
then for both i − 1 and i we must be in the second case, and we cannot have
xi+1 − xi = xi+2 − xi+1. So for any two consecutive is we must be in the same
case, and by induction it must be the same case for all i.
To prove the second part of the proposition, assume that the first case holds
for all i. We want to show that xi+1 − xi ≥
(
c− 1
c
− 1
)
(xi − x1) for all i ∈
{2, . . . , n−1} by induction on i. By substituting i = 1 into the second inequality
of the first case, we get x2 ≤
(c−1)x1+x3
c
, so
(
c− 1
c
− 1
)
(x2− x1) ≤ (c− 1)(x2−
x1) ≤ x3 − x2. By substituting i = 1 into the first inequality of the case,
we obtain cx3 < (c − 1)x1 + x4 which implies x4 − x3 > (c − 1)(x3 − x1) >(
c− 1− 1
c
)
(x3 − x1). Thus, the induction hypothesis is true for i = 2 and
i = 3.
Next, we assume for induction that xi − xi−1 ≥
(
c− 1
c
− 1
)
(xi−1 − x1) and
we want to prove xi+2−xi+1 ≥
(
c− 1
c
− 1
)
(xi+1−x1), so we use the induction
hypothesis for i − 1 to prove it for i + 1. By substituting i − 1 instead of i in
17
the first inequality of the first case we get cxi+1 < (c− 1)xi−1 + xi+2, so
xi+2 − xi+1 >(c− 1)(xi+1 − xi−1)
=
(
c− 1−
1
c
)
(xi+1 − xi−1) +
1
c
(xi+1 − xi−1)
≥
(
c− 1−
1
c
)
(xi+1 − xi−1) + (xi − xi−1)
≥
(
c− 1−
1
c
)
(xi+1 − xi−1) +
(
c− 1−
1
c
)
(xi−1 − x1)
≥
(
c− 1−
1
c
)
(xi+1 − x1).
Here the second inequality follows from xi <
(c−1)xi−1+xi+1
c
and the third in-
equality follows from the induction hypothesis.
The proof that xi− xi−1 ≥
(
c− 1
c
− 1
)
(xn− xi) if the second case holds for
all i is similar.
Theorem 17. Given r ≥ 1 there exist kr, ǫr > 0 and an agenda Ar with 16r−13
players and at most 3(r−1) nodes per player such that for any
(
ǫ, ǫ
1− 1
r
10
)
-timing
of Ar with ǫ ≤ ǫr we need time at least exp
r
2
(
krǫ
− 1
r!(r−1)!
)
.
Proof. We construct the games recursively. We define A1 = 2|3332|111|2. To
construct Ar for r > 1 we first take Ar−1, and add two separators on either
side. E.g., for r = 2 this gives us ||2|3332|111|2||. For each of the players in
Ar−1, we then give them a node between the first two separators and a node
between the last two. In the example, this gives |123|2|3332|111|2|123|. Around
the first 4 separators we put four new players a, b, c, d to ensure that the gaps
between consecutive separators either increase or decrease using the pattern
bd|cc|adda|bb|ac. For r = 2 we now have
bd|cc123|adda2|bb3332|ac111|2|123|.
Then around separators 2 to 5 we then put the player e, f, g, h. The example
becomes
bd|ccfh123|addagg2|bbehhe3332|acff111|eg2|123|.
Similarly, we put the players i, j, k, l around separators 3 to 6 and the players
m, n, o, p around separators 4 to 7. This gives
bd|ccfh123|addaggjl2|bbehhekknp3332|acffillioo111|egjjmppm2|iknn123|mo
If there are more groups of 4 consecutive separators left, we could continue
the same way. However, we can now reuse players, so player a, b, c, d will be
used around separators 5 to 8 and so on. This uses 16 players more than for
Ar−1, so by induction Ar has 16r − 13 players. The new players each have
3
⌊
4r−1
4
⌋
= 3(r − 1) nodes, and all other players have 2 nodes more than in the
r − 1 game. By induction each player has at most 3(r − 1) nodes.
Now we want to show that we need a long time to time these agendas.
We know from Lemma 14 that any
(
ǫ, 110
)
-timing of 2|33|11|2 will need time
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at least exp2((2ǫ)
−1). Furthermore, from any
(
ǫ, 110
)
-timing of 2|3332|111|2
we can throw away the middle time for each player and get an
(
ǫ, 110
)
-timing
of 2|33|11|2. This proves the base case. (The middle node is needed in the
induction step, to ensure that player 2 can see if the gaps between separators
increase or decrease).
Next let r > 1 and assume that the statement holds for r − 1. Define
ǫr =
ǫ
r(r−1)
r−1
180r .
Assume that we have an (ǫ, ǫ
1− 1
r
10 )-timing X of Ar where ǫ < ǫr. By Propo-
sition 13 we can assume that Xi,j ≥ 0 for all i, j. For each i ∈ [4r− 4] we claim
that there is probability at least 1 −
(
8ǫ
1
r−1−1 + 3
1− 2
ǫ
1
r−1
−1
)
(2ǫ
1− 1
r
10 + ǫ) that
we have either
1. X|,i+2 <
(ǫ
1
r−1
−1
−1)X|,i+X|,i+3
ǫ
1
r−1
−1
and X|,i+1 <
(ǫ
1
r−1
−1
−1)X|,i+X|,i+2
ǫ
1
r−1
−1
, or
2. X|,i+1 >
X|,i+(ǫ
1
r−1
−1
−1)X|,i+3
ǫ
1
r−1
−1
and X|,i+2 >
X|,i+1+(ǫ
1
r−1
−1
−1)X|,i+3
ǫ
1
r−1
−1
.
If i is of the form 4j + 1, we show this using the players a, b, c, d: As we have
an (ǫ, ǫ
1− 1
r
10 ) timing of our agenda, we can take the (3j + 1)th, (3j + 2)th, and
(3j+3)th nodes of these four players and the (4j+1)th, (4j+2)th, (4j+3)th and
(4j+4)th separator and get an (ǫ, ǫ
1− 1
r
10 )-timing of the agenda bd|cc|adda|bb|ac.
The claim now follows from Lemma 15. If i is of the form 4j + 2 we would use
player e, f, g, h instead, and so on. This proves the claim.
Let T be the random variable that is 1 if one of the two cases holds for each
i ∈ [4r − 4] and 0 otherwise. By the union bound
Pr(T = 0) ≤(4r − 4)

8ǫ 1r−1−1 + 3
1− 2
ǫ
1
r−1
−1

 (2ǫ1− 1r
10
+ ǫ)
≤4r
(
9ǫ
1
r−1−1
)
1.2ǫ1−
1
r
=44rǫ
1
r−1−
1
r .
Let X ′ = X |T=1 be the timing of the agenda given T = 1. By Proposition 6 X
′
is an (ǫ′, ǫ1−
1
r )-timing with
ǫ′ ≤
ǫ+ 44rǫ
1
r−1−
1
r
1− 44rǫ
1
r−1−
1
r
≤ 2
(
45rǫ
1
r−1−
1
r
)
= 90rǫ
1
(r−1)r .
Given X ′ we will then construct a
(
180rǫ
1
(r−1)r ,
(
180rǫ
1
(r−1)r
)1− 1
r
)
-timing
of Ar−1. First we want to argue that for a timing X
′, each of the old players
(players from Ar−1) can figure out if the gaps between X|,is are increasing or
decreasing. By induction, each player has ki ≥ 2r + 1 ≥ 5 nodes. Furthermore,
in Ar−1 each player occurs at most once before the first separator, so in Ar each
old player occurs at most twice before the third separator, so Xi,3 ≥ X|,3−
ǫ
1− 1
r
10
(here and in the following i denotes the number of an old player). Conversely,
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Xi,3 ≤ Xi,ki−2 ≤ X|,k|−2+
ǫ
1− 1
r
10 . As each of the old players has a node between
the first two separators and a node between the last two separators, we get
Xi,1 ≤ X|,2+
ǫ
1− 1
r
10 and Xi,ki ≥ X|,k|−1−
ǫ
1− 1
r
10 . Let c = ǫ
1
r−1−1. If we are in the
case where gaps between separators increases, we get
Xi,ki −Xi,3 ≥
(
X|,k|−1 −
ǫ1−
1
r
10
)
−
(
X|,k|−2 +
ǫ1−
1
r
10
)
=
(
X|,k|−1 −X|,k|−2
)
−
1
5
ǫ1−
1
r
≥
(
c−
1
c
− 1
)
(X|,k|−2 −X|,2)− ǫ
1− 1
r
≥ (c− 2)
(
Xi,3 −
ǫ1−
1
r
10
−Xi,1 −
ǫ1−
1
r
10
)
− ǫ1−
1
r
≥ (c− 2) (Xi,3 −Xi,1)− cǫ
1− 1
r
≥3(Xi,3 −Xi,1)− ǫ
1
r−1−1ǫ1−
1
r
=3(Xi,3 −Xi,1)− ǫ
1
r−1−
1
r
≥3(Xi,3 −Xi,1)− 1
>Xi,3 −Xi,1.
The second inequality follows from Proposition 16 on the sequence x|,2, x|,3, . . . , x|,k| .
In the fifth inequality we use c − 2 ≥ 3 which is equivalent to ǫ
1
r−1−1 ≥ 5 and
follows from ǫ ≤ ǫr =
ǫ
r(r−1)
r−1
180r <
1
25 . Finally, we use ǫ < 1 and Xi,3 − Xi,1 ≥
X|,3 −X|,2 −
2ǫ1−
1
r
10 ≥
1
2 .
Conversely, if we are in the case where gaps between separators decrease, a
similar computation shows that Xi,3 −Xi,1 > Xi,ki −Xi,3. Thus, if one knows
that i is a player from Ar−1 and one knows X
′
i, one can then decide if the gaps
between the X ′|,js are increasing or decreasing, even if one does not know i. Let
S be the random variable that is 1 if the gaps are increasing and 2 if they are
decreasing. We must have either Pr(S = 1) ≥ 12 or Pr(S = 2) ≥
1
2 . Assume
without loss of generality that we have Pr(S = 1) ≥ 12 . As the supports of the
Xi|S=1s are disjoint from the supports of the Xj |S=2s Proposition 4 gives us
δ(X ′i, X
′
j) =Pr(S = 1)δ(X
′
i|S=1, X
′
j |S=1) + Pr(S = 2)δ(X
′
i|S=2, X
′
j |S=2)
≥
1
2
δ(X ′i|S=1, X
′
j |S=1).
We define X ′′ = X ′|S=1. By the above inequality we have δ(X
′′
i , X
′′
j ) ≤
δ(X ′i, X
′
j) ≤ 2 · 90rǫ
1
(r−1)r for all old players i and j with ki = kj .
We now define a timing Y of Ar−1 by
• Yi,j = log(Xi,j+1 −Xi,1) for all numbers i, j such that player i occurs at
least j times in Ar−1.
• Y|,j = log(X|,j+2 −X|,2) for all numbers j less than the number of sepa-
rators in Ar−1.
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We want to show that this is a

180rǫ 1(r−1)r ,
(
180rǫ
1
(r−1)r
)1− 1
r
10

-timing of Ar−1.
If we can show that, the induction hypothesis then implies that the highest value
that the Yp,is take must be at least
expr−12
(
kr−1
(
436rǫ
1
(r−1)r
)− 1
(r−1)!(r−2)!
)
=expr−12
(
krǫ
− 1(r)!(r−1)!
)
.
As the Xi,1s are non-negative this implies that X
′′ and X have to take values
of at least 2
expr−12
(
krǫ
− 1
(r)!(r−1)!
)
= expr2
(
krǫ
− 1(r)!(r−1)!
)
.
To finish the proof we only need to check that Y satisfies the 6 requirements
for an (ǫ′′, ǫ
′′1− 1
r−1
10 )-timing of Ar−1 with ǫ
′′ = 180rǫ
1
(r−1)r .
First, for fixed i the Xi,js are increasing in j so the Yi,js are real numbers.
We also have X|,j + 1 ≤ X|,j+1, so the Y|,js are non-negative.
The second requirement says Y|,j + 1 ≤ Y|,j+1. By using Proposition 16 on
the sequence x|,2, . . . , x|,k| we get
X|,j+3 −X|,2 =X|,j+3 −X|,j+2 +X|,j+2 −X|,2
≥
(
c−
1
c
− 1
)
(X|,j+2 −X|,2) +X|,j+2 −X|,2
=
(
c−
1
c
)
(X|,j+2 −X|,2)
≥2(X|,j+2 −X|,2)
where c = ǫ
1
r
−1 ≥ 3. Hence,
Y|,j+1 = log(X|,j+3 −X|,2) ≥ log(2(X|,j+2 −X|,2)) = 1 + log(X|,j+2 −X|,2) = Y|,j + 1.
The third requirement says that for fixed i the Yi,j should be increasing in
j. This follows from the similar fact for Xi,j .
To show the fourth requirement assume that the j1’th occurrence of i in Ar−1
is before the j2’th occurrence of |. We need to show that Yi,j1 ≤ Y|,j2 +
ǫ
′′1− 1
r−1
10 .
From the assumptions we have that the j1 + 1th occurrence of i in Ar is before
the j2 + 2’th occurrence of |. As X is an
(
ǫ, ǫ
1− 1
r−1
10
)
-timing this implies that
Xi,j1+1 ≤ X|,j2+2 +
ǫ
1− 1
r
10 , and in general we have Xi,1 ≥ X|,1 −
ǫ
1− 1
r
10 . Finally,
because we are in the case where the gaps are increasing we have X|,2 −X|,1 ≤
X|,3−X|,2
c−1 ≤
X|,j2+2−X|,2
c−1 so
X|,j2+2 −X|,1 =X|,j2+2 −X|,2 +X|,2 −X|,1
≤
c
c− 1
(X|,j2+2 −X|,2).
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Thus, we have
Yi,j1 = log(Xi,j1+1 −Xi,1)
≤ log
(
X|,j2+2 +
ǫ1−
1
r
10
−X|,1 +
ǫ1−
1
r
10
)
= log(X|,j2+2 −X|,1) + log
(
X|,j2+2 −X|,1 +
1
5ǫ
1− 1
r
X|,j2+2 −X|,1
)
≤ log(X|,j2+2 −X|,2) + log
(
c
c− 1
)
+ log
(
1 +
ǫ1−
1
r
10
)
≤Y|,j2 + log(1 +
2
c
) +
2
10
ǫ1−
1
r
≤Y|,j2 + 4ǫ
1− 1
r−1 +
1
5
ǫ1−
1
r
≤Y|,j2 + 5ǫ
1− 1
r−1
≤Y|,j2 +
(ǫ′′)1−
1
r−1
10
.
The last inequality follows from ǫ′′ = 180rǫ
1
(r−1)r .
To show the fifth requirement assume that j1’th occurrence of i in Ar−1 is
after the j2’th occurrence of |. We need to show that Yi,j1 ≥ Y|,j2 −
ǫ
′′1− 1
r−1
10 .
The assumption implies that the j1 + 1’th occurrence of i in Ar is after the
j2 + 2’th occurrence of |, so we have
Yi,j1 = log(Xi,j1+1 −Xi,1)
≥ log(X|,j2+2 −
ǫ1−
1
r
10
−X|,2 −
ǫ1−
1
r
10
)
≥ log(X|,j2+2 −X|,2) + log
(
X|,j2+2 −X|,2 −
1
5ǫ
1− 1
r
X|,j2+2 −X|,2
)
≥Y|,j + log
(
1−
1
10
ǫ1−
1
r
)
≥Y|,j −
2
10
ǫ1−
1
r
≥Y|,j −
ǫ′′1−
1
r
10
.
Here the second to last inequality follows from ǫ
1− 1
r
10 ≤
1
2 .
Finally, the last requirement says that if ki = kj then δ(Yi, Yj) ≤ ǫ
′′. This
follows from the fact that δ(X ′′i , X
′′
j ) ≤ ǫ
′′ and the fact that Yi is a function of
X ′′i .
Corollary 18. Given r ≥ 1 there exists ǫr > 0 and a game with 16r+3 players
and at most 3r nodes per player per history such that for any ǫ-timing of the
game with ǫ ≤ ǫr we need time at least exp
r
2
(
ǫ−1
)
.
Proof. Let r be given. We know from Theorem 17 that there exist kr+1, ǫ
′
r+1 > 0
and an agenda Ar+1 with 16r + 3 players and at most 3r nodes per player
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such that for any (ǫ, ǫr+1)-timing of Ar+1 with ǫ ≤ ǫ
′
r+1 we need time at least
expr+12
(
kr+1ǫ
− 1
(r+1)!r!
)
. We know that for all c > 0 we have log(x) ≤ xc
for all sufficiently large x. Using this for x = ǫ−1 and c = 1(r+1)!r! we get
log(ǫ−1) ≤ kr+1ǫ
− 1(r+1)!r! for sufficiently small ǫ. By exponentiating on both
sides we get exp
(
kr+1ǫ
− 1
(r+1)!r!
)
≥ ǫ−1. Thus, there is some ǫr such that for
any (ǫ, ǫ1−
1
r )-timing of Ar+1 with ǫ ≤ ǫr we need time at least exp
r
2
(
ǫ−1
)
.
Let Γr be the symmetric choiceless game obtained from Ar+1 by removing the
separators. Now any ǫ-timing of Γr must be an (ǫ, 0)-timing, and hence also
an (ǫ, ǫ1−
1
r )-timing of Ar+1. Thus, any ǫ-timing of Γr must use time at least
expr2
(
ǫ−1
)
.
6 Imperfect timekeeping
Previously we assumed that at any time all the players knew the exact time. In
practice, this is not a realistic assumption. Even our model of time—that there
exists an absolute time, and that everybody’s time goes at the same speed—has
been proven wrong by relativity theory. If the players cannot feel acceleration,
one could use the twin paradox to time games that otherwise cannot be exactly
timed [5].4 A more down-to-earth objection is that it might be possible affect
humans’ or even computers’ perception of time if you control their environment.
The purpose of this section it to show that our lower bounds are quite robust:
even if we can determine the players’ perception of time within some reasonable
bounds, there are games that take a long time to ǫ-time. We will assume each
node occurs at some “official” time, x, and that we can also decide the players’
perception y of that time. The following definition also models a situation where
the players do not know when the game started.
Definition 6. Let l, u : R+ → R+ be weakly increasing functions satisfying
l(t) ≤ t ≤ u(t). A deterministic [l, u]-timing of a game Γ is an assignment of a
tuple (xv, yv) (two nonnegative real numbers) to each node v such that:
1. If we label Γ with just the xv values we have a timing of Γ.
2. If v and w are two nodes belonging to the same player and v is on the
path from the root to w then l(xw − xv) ≤ yw − yv ≤ u(xw − xv).
An [l, u]-timing is a distribution over deterministic [l, u]-timings. The timing
information of player i at a node w given an [l, u]-timing consists of the perceived
times, yv, of all nodes v belonging to that player between the root and w. Now
an (ǫ, [l, u])-timing is an [l, u]-timing such that for any two nodes belonging to
the same information set, the current player’s timing information at the two
nodes has total variation distance at most ǫ. An [l, u]-timing is an exact [l, u]-
timing if it is a (0, [l, u])-timing.
The next theorem says that even if we can affect the players’ clocks by some
large constant factor c, there still exist games that cannot be ǫ-timed in time
expr2(
1
ǫ
).
4The question whether it is possible to implement a not exactly timeable game on players
who are equipped with a perfect accelerometer is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Theorem 19. Let c be an integer and let l, u be functions as in Definition 6 and
such that l(x) ≥ x
c
and u(x) ≤ cx. Then for any r there exists a game Γc,r with
16(2c4 + r) + 11 players such that for sufficiently small ǫ any (ǫ, [l(x), u(x)])-
timing of Γc,r has to use time at least exp
r
2
(
1
ǫ
)
.
In order to prove Theorem 19 we will show that there exists symmetric
choiceless games, where all (ǫ, [u, l])-timing takes a long time to time. To do
this, we will use symmetric choiceless games with separators. Unlike for agendas,
these separators are not a part of the game, they are only used in the proof.
For example, for the game 24|33|1441|22|13 we could say “for any ǫ-timing
of this game the two middle separator will with high probability either both
be much closer to the first than the last separator or both be much closer to
the last then the first separator”. This is just a simpler way of saying, “if X
is a timing of 243314412213 and (X,X|,1, X|,2, X|,3, X|,4) is jointly distributed
such that X4,1 < X|,1 < X3,1, X3,2 < X|,2 < X4,2, X1,2 < X|,3 < X2,2 and
X2,3 < X|,4 < X1,3 then with high probability X|,2 and X|,3 are either both
much closer to X|,1 than to X|,4 or both much closer to X|,4 than to X|,1”.
Lemma 20. Let c be an integer and let l, u be functions as in Definition 6 and
such that l(x) ≥ x
c
and u(x) ≤ cx. Let n = 4c4 + 1.
If X is a symmetric (ǫ, [l, u])-timing of the symmetric choiceless game Γ with
2n players given by 12 . . . n|(n+1)(n+1)(n+2)(n+2) . . . (2n)(2n)||1122 . . . nn|(n+
1)(n+ 2) . . . (2n), the probability that both
1.
X|,4−X|,2
X|,4−X|,1
≥ 2c−2, and
2.
X|,3−X|,1
X|,4−X|,1
≥ 2c−2
is at most 2ǫ, where X|,i denote the actual time of the j’th node belonging to
player |.
Proof. Suppose we have an (ǫ, [l, u])-timing of Γ. Let Xi,j denote the actual
time of the j’th node belonging to player i, and let Yi,j denote the perceived
time. Define f(x, y, z) = y−z
x−z and f(Xi) = f(Xi,1, Xi,2, Xi,3) and similar for
f(Yi). If x < y < z then f(x, y, z) is increasing in y and decreasing in x and z.
For particular values x and y of X and Y , let n1 be the number of i ≤ n for
which f(xi) ≤ 1−
1
2c2 and let n2 be the number of i > n for which f(xi) ≥
1
2c2 .
We will argue that n1n2 ≤ 4c
4. For i > n we have
f(xi) =
xi,2 − xi1
xi,3 − xi,1
≤
xi,2 − xi,1∑n
j=1(xi,3 − xi,2)
,
so if f(xi) ≥
1
2c2 then
n∑
j=1
(xi,3 − xi,2) ≤ 2c
2(xi,2 − xi,1).
This hold for each of the n2 values of i > n for which f(xi) ≥
1
2c2 , so
2c2
2n∑
j=n+1
(xi,2 − xi,1) ≥ n2
n∑
j=1
(xi,3 − xi,2).
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Completely analogously we get
2c2
n∑
j=1
(xi,3 − xi,2) ≥ n1
2n∑
j=n+1
(xi,2 − xi,1).
Putting this together gives
4c4
2n∑
j=n+1
(xi,2 − xi,1) ≥ 2c
2n2
n∑
j=1
(xi,3 − xi,2) ≥ n1n2
2n∑
j=n+1
(xi,2 − xi,1),
hence n1n2 ≤ 4c
4.
Furthermore, if i > n and f(xi) ≥
1
2c2 we have
1
2c2
≤ f(xi) =
xi,2 − xi,1
xi3 − xi,1
≤
xi,2 − xi,1
x|,4 − x|,2
Thus, if
x|,4−x|,2
x|,4−x|,1
≥ 2c−2 we get
1
2c2
2
c2
≤
xi,2 − xi,1
x|,4 − x|,2
x|,4 − x|,2
x|,4 − x|,1
so
c4(x|,4 − x|,1) ≥ xi,2 − xi,1
As all the intervals [xi,1, xi,2] are disjoint and contained in [X|,1, X|,4] we see
that if
x|,4−x|,2
x|,4−x|,1
≥ 2
c2
we must have n1 ≤ c
4. Completely analogously we get
that if
x|,3−x|,1
x|,4−x|,1
≥ 2
c2
we must have n2 ≤ c
4.
For general i we have
1− f(yi) =
yi,3 − yi,2
yi,3 − yi,1
≤
(xi,3 − xi,2)c
(xi,3 − xi,1)/c
= c2(1− f(xi))
and f(yi) ≤ c
2f(xi). In particular, if f(xi) ≤
1
2c2 then f(yi) ≤
1
2 and if
f(xi) ≥ 1−
1
2c2 then f(yi) ≥
1
2 . Thus, the number of i ≤ n with f(yi) <
1
2 is at
most n1 and the number of i > n with f(yi) ≥
1
2 is at most n2.
In the above n1 and n2 where determined by the value x that X take. Thus,
for random X we get random variables N1 and N2.
By assumption on the timing, for any two i, i′ we have δ(Yi, Yi′ ) ≤ ǫ. In
particular if I is uniformly distributed on [n] and I ′ is uniformly distributed on
[2n]\ [n] then by Proposition 4 we have δ(YI , YI′) ≤ ǫ. Let g(yi) be the function
that is 1 if f(yi) ≥
1
2 and 0 otherwise. Then we must have
Eg(YI)− g(YI′) ≤ ǫ.
We know that Eg(YI) ≥
(
E1 − N1
n
)
and Eg(YI′) ≤ E
N2
n
. We have N1, N2 ≤ n,
so if one of them is zero, then g(YI) − g(YI′) ≥ 0. In the cases where both are
non-zero we have N1N2 ≤ 4c
4 and they are both integers so N1+N2 ≤ 4c
4+1.
Hence, g(YI) − g(YI′) ≥ 1 −
N1
n
− n2
n
≥ n−4c
4−1
n
≥ 0, so for all values of X we
have g(YI)− g(YI′) ≥ 0. We have shown that when
x|,4−x|,2
x|,4−x|,1
≥ 2
c2
then n1 ≤ c
4
and when
x|,3−x|,1
x|,4−x|,1
≥ 2
c2
we must have n2 ≤ c
4. Thus, this case contributes with
g(YI)−g(YI′ ) ≥ 1−
N1
n
− N2
n
≥ 1− 2c
4
n
≥ 12 , so the probability that
x|,4−x|,2
x|,4−x|,1
≥ 2
c2
and
x|,3−x|,1
x|,4−x|,1
≥ 2
c2
is at most 2ǫ.
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Proof sketch of Theorem 19. Same idea as the induction step of the proof The-
orem 17: We will construct symmetric choices games that takes a long time to
(ǫ, [u, l])-time. An argument analogously to the proof of Proposition 12 shows
that it is enough to consider symmetric timings. By Corollary 18 there exists a
game Γr that cannot be ǫ-timing in time less than exp
r
2(ǫ
−1). We then modify
Γr: Between any two nodes of Γr we put three separators, and before the first
node and after the last, first three separators, then outside that we put one
node for each player, and then a “|” before and after all the other nodes. For
example, the game 233112 becomes
|123|||2|||3|||3|||1|||1|||2|||123|.
Around the first 4 separators, we put 2(4k4+1) players as in Lemma 20, around
separator 2 to 5 we put 2(4k4 + 1) other players and so on. When we get to
separators 5 to 8 we can reuse players as in the induction step of the proof of
Theorem 17, so in total we use 8(4k4 + 1) players, and these ensure that with
probability O(ǫ) gap between the separators will either increase fast or decrease
fast. The players from Γr will now be able to see if the gaps are decreasing or
increasing. If they are increasing the players will look at the difference between
their first node and their i’th. Because their perception of this gap is of by at
most a factor k, and the distances between these gaps will differ by almost a
factor k4, the ordering of the perceptions of these distances will be the same
at the actual ordering. Hence, the logarithms of the perceived distances is a
timing of Γr and must use numbers as large as exp
r
2(Ω(
1
ǫ
)), in particular any
(ǫ, [l, u])-timing of Γr,c must use time at least exp
r+1
2 (Ω(
1
ǫ
)) and hence expr2(
1
ǫ
)
for sufficiently small ǫ.
The next theorem shows that the above is the strongest theorem we can
hope for: if we can make the players’ clocks go faster or slower by more that a
constant factor, we can implement all games.
Theorem 21. Let Γ be a game and l, u functions as in Definition 6 with u(t)
l(t) →
∞ as t→∞. Then Γ is exactly [l, u]-timeable.
Proof. LetM be the maximal number of nodes in any history of Γ. As u(t)
l(t) →∞
we must have either lim supt→∞
u(t)
t
= ∞ or lim supt→∞
t
l(t) = ∞. In the first
case we can find t0 ≥ 1 such that u(t0) ≥ M
2t0 ≥ Ml(Mt0). Similarly, in the
second case we can find t0 ≥ 1 such that M
2l(Mt0) ≤ Mt0 ≤ Mu(t0), hence
Ml(Mt0) ≤ u(t0).
Now we define an [l, u]-timing of Γ. If a node v has distance iv from the
root, we set xv = ivt0, and if v is the jv’th node belonging that player in the
history leading to v, then yv = jvl(Mt0). Clearly, the xv give a deterministic
timing of Γ as t0 ≥ 1. If v, w are two nodes belonging to the same player with
v on the path from the root to w we have yw − yv = (jw − jv)l(Mt0) and
l(xw − xv) ≤ l(Mt0) ≤ (jw − jv)l(Mt0) ≤Ml(Mt0) ≤ u(t0) ≤ u(xw − xv).
Thus, we have constructed an [l, u]-timing. If v and w a two nodes belonging to
the same information set, we must have jv = jw, and the timing information for
each of them is (l(Mt0), 2l(Mt0), . . . , jul(Mt0)), so it is an exact [l, u]-timing.
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7 Conclusion
Not every extensive-form game can be naturally implemented in the world.
Games with imperfect recall constitute a well known example of this. In this
paper, we have drawn attention to another feature that is likely to prevent the
direct implementation of the game in the world: games that are not exactly
timeable. We gave necessary and sufficient conditions for a game to be exactly
timeable and showed that they are easy to check. Most of the technical contri-
bution concerned approximately timing games; we showed that this can always
be done, but can require large amounts of time.
Future research can take a number of directions. Does restricting attention
to exactly timeable games allow one to prove new results about these games,
or develop new algorithms for solving them—as is the case for perfect recall?
It is conceivable that the possibility of games that are not exactly timeable
has been an unappreciated and unnecessary roadblock to the development of
certain theoretical or algorithmic results. Can our techniques be applied to the
design of protocols that should not leak information to participants by means
of the time at which they receive messages? Are there natural families of games
for which we can obtain desirable bounds for the amount of time required to
approximately time them?
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